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Abstract
The authors use a dynamic general-equilibrium model to study the role ﬁnancial frictions play as
a transmission mechanism of Canadian monetary policy, and to evaluate the real effects of
exogenous credit shocks. Financial frictions, which are modelled as spreads between deposit and
loan interest rates, are assumed to depend on economic activity as well as on credit shocks. A
general ﬁnding is that almost all of the real response to a monetary policy shock comes from the
price rigidity and not the credit frictions. Credit shocks, however, do have substantial real effects
on macroeconomic variables. Thus, in this model, imperfections in credit markets are responsible
only for a small ampliﬁcation and propagation of the real effects of monetary policy shocks.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, E4, E51
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions; Monetary policy framework; Transmission of mone-
tary policy
Résumé
Les auteurs utilisent un modèle dynamique d’équilibre général pour étudier le rôle que jouent les
frictions ﬁnancières comme mécanisme de transmission de la politique monétaire canadienne.
Ils évaluent aussi les effets réels de chocs exogènes de crédit. Les frictions ﬁnancières sont
modélisées comme l’écart entre les taux d’intérêt des dépôts et ceux des empruts bancaires. Elles
dépendent ainsi de l’activité économique et des chocs de crédit. La conclusion générale qui
découle de cette étude est que la majeure partie des effets réels des chocs de politique monétaire
est due à la rigidité des prix et non aux frictions ﬁnancières. Cependant, les chocs de crédit
affectent signiﬁcativement les variables macroéconomiques. Par conséquent, l’imperfection des
marchés du crédit n’explique dans ce modèle qu’une faible part de l’ampliﬁcation et de la
propagation des effets réels des chocs de politique monétaire.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E32, E4, E51
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières; Cadre de la politique monétaire; Transmis-
sion de la politique monétaire1
1. Introduction
In the literature, it is argued that bank lending plays an important role in the monetary
transmission mechanism. Banks, by their very nature, are well-suited to deal with certain types of
borrowers, especially small ﬁrms, where the problems of asymmetric information can be
pronounced. From the perspective of bank lending, monetary policy affects the balance sheet of
the banks. For example, an increase in interest rates by the monetary authority implies that banks
will have to pay more in the overnight loans market. The rise in the overnight rate in turn leads to
adjustments in interest rates and a decrease in the supply of bank credit, as banks shift out of risky
loans and into safer assets. Tight monetary policy also leads to a fall in bank deposits, which
results in a further fall in bank lending and consequently a fall in investment and output.
Ultimately, prices fall. Declines in bank lending induced by a monetary contraction should also
cause a decline in household expenditures on durables and housing: increases in interest rates lead
to a deterioration in household balance sheets because of the fall in their cash ﬂow.
In this paper, we examine the role of the banking sector in the monetary transmission mechanism
and assess the contribution of exogenous credit shocks to the ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output.1
We employ a dynamic general-equilibrium model (DGEM) to examine whether the intermediation
process acts as a source of ﬂuctuations or as a propagator of the business cycle. By choosing the
DGEM, which is founded on microeconomic principles and identiﬁes the structural links between
the various sectors of the economy, we are able to identify shocks and measure their impact on
consumption, investment, capital stock, and output. In effect, the richness of the model enables us
to analyze the role of bank credit in economic ﬂuctuations.
The DGEM is considered under various scenarios. First, we examine the model when there are
credit frictions and price- and capital-adjustment costs. Second, we examine the model when
there are credit frictions and capital-adjustment costs. Third, to gauge the impact of credit, we re-
examine the model under the ﬁrst scenario with no credit friction.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the transmission mechanism and
the special nature of bank lending. Section 3 describes the model’s salient features, and section 4
the results of our calibration exercise. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
1. By exogenous credit shocks we mean the tightening or easing of credit conditions by intermediaries.
These intermediaries may change credit conditions as a response to changes in asset markets or
technological innovations inthe ﬁnancial sector.2
2. The Transmission of Monetary Policy and the “Specialness” of
Intermediaries
2.1 The transmission mechanism
Monetary policy is a powerful tool, but one that sometimes has unexpected or unwanted
consequences. To succeed in the conduct and implementation of monetary policy, monetary
authorities must have an accurate assessment of the timing and effect of their policies on the
economy. An understanding is therefore required of the mechanisms through which monetary
policy affects the economy.
Traditionally, economists have explained the transmission mechanism through the interest rate
and the exchange rate channels. The interest rate channel, a key component of how monetary
policy effects are transmitted to the economy, suggests that, when contractionary monetary policy
raises the short-term nominal interest rate, the real long-term interest rate rises as well, as a result
of sticky prices and rational expectations. These higher real interest rates lead to a decline in
business ﬁxed investment, residential housing investment, consumer durable expenditure, and
inventory investment, which causes a decline in aggregate output. The decline in output leads to a
fall in the output gap and eventually a decline in prices and wages.
Because Canada is a small open economy with a ﬂexible exchange rate, monetary policy
transmission also operates through exchange rate effects on net exports. This channel involves
interest rate effects, because when domestic real interest rates rise, Canadian-dollar deposits
become more attractive than deposits denominated in foreign currencies, leading to an
appreciation of the Canadian dollar. This appreciation makes domestic goods more expensive than
foreign goods, causing a fall in net exports and hence in aggregate output. Consequently, prices
fall. An appreciation of the exchange rate will lower imported inﬂation, since foreign goods
become cheaper.
Complementing the interest rate and exchange rate channels of the transmission mechanism is the
credit channel, in which bank lending plays an important role. The credit channel is based on the
view that banks play a special role in the ﬁnancial system, because they are well-suited to deal
with certain types of borrowers, particularly small ﬁrms, where the problems of asymmetric
information can be pronounced. (Large ﬁrms are deemed to have access to external sources of
ﬁnance without having to go through banks.) Thus, tight monetary policy that increases interest
rates leads to a fall in bank deposits, which leads to a fall in bank lending and, consequently, a fall
in investment and output. Ultimately, prices fall.3
Strengthening the bank lending channel is the balance-sheet channel, which operates through the
net worth of business ﬁrms. Lower net worth means that borrowers have less collateral with which
to back their loans. Such a decline in net worth raises the adverse-selection problem by raising the
percentage of risky ﬁrms in the economy, inducing banks to decrease lending to ﬁnance
investment spending. Lower net worth also increases the moral hazard problem: owners have a
lower equity stake in their ﬁrms, giving them more incentive to engage in risky investment
projects. Since this makes it less likely that lenders will be repaid, a decrease in ﬁrms' net worth
leads to a decrease in lending and hence in investment spending. Thus, contractionary monetary
policy, which causes a decline in equity prices and a reduction in the net worth of ﬁrms, leads to a
fall in lending, investment, and output. In addition, contractionary monetary policy that raises
interest rates reduces the cash ﬂows of ﬁrms. The fall in cash ﬂow leads to greater adverse
selection and moral hazard problems and, consequently, a fall in lending and a decline in
aggregate demand.
2.2 Why intermediaries are special
Bank lending plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy; it helps satisfy the
external ﬁnancial needs of ﬁrms, particularly smaller ﬁrms. Financial-contracting theory suggests
that, under asymmetric information, smaller ﬁrms rely on intermediaries to reduce agency costs.
Financial contracts tend to involve tight and detailed loan covenants. The efﬁciency of
intermediaries allows them to monitor and renegotiate these contracts at a lower cost. By frequent
monitoring of these contracts, intermediaries become better informed about ﬁrms and they
develop special relationships with each other.
In explaining the special role of banks, Himmelberg and Morgan (1995) suggest that lenders
attempt to control agency problems by imposing restrictive covenants in lending contracts. These
covenants require ﬁrms to maintain minimum levels of net worth and working capital. Because of
the difﬁculty in determining the true ﬁnancial health of a ﬁrm, the covenants require frequent
monitoring of the ﬁrm. Diamond (1984) suggests that the set-up of intermediaries makes them
perfect monitors. Himmelberg and Morgan (1995) argue that intermediaries are more efﬁcient at
monitoring ﬁnancial contracts for at least two reasons. First, because of their large stake in the
projects, intermediaries will conduct frequent monitoring to determine whether a covenant has
been violated. Second, intermediaries can renegotiate a covenant more easily and cheaply than
dispersed public lenders, such as bondholders.
Asquith, Gertner, and Sharfstein (1994) suggest that another factor that makes banks special is
their ﬂexibility in dealing with ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms. For example, when a ﬁrm fails to make4
a payment or breaks a covenant, banks generally restructure the loan contract. The new contract
may waive some elements of the covenant, prolong the maturity of the debt, or require more
collateral to be posted. By restructuring the contract, banks reduce the cost of ﬁnancial distress on
ﬁrms. Market-based lenders, such as bondholders, who do not have this ﬂexibility in renegotiating
with ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms, generally force those ﬁrms into bankruptcy.
In sum, banks or intermediaries are special, especially for small businesses. The intense
monitoring of projects, the tight and detailed covenants on loan contracts, and the special
relationship between banks and clients make bank credit an imperfect substitute for other forms of
credit. The imperfect substitution between bank and non-bank credit contributes to the bank
lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism.
3. The Model
The model we use is very similar to that used by Dib (2002), which is inspired by Ireland (1997,
2000).2 There are ﬁve agents in this economy: a representative household, a representative ﬁnal-
good-producing ﬁrm, a continuum of intermediate-good-producing ﬁrms indexed by , a
ﬁnancial intermediary, and a monetary authority. The representative ﬁnal-good producer sells its
output, yt, to households at a perfectly competitive price, pt. Purchases of intermediate-good
producers must be ﬁnanced through borrowing from the ﬁnancial intermediary. The intermediate-
good producer is assumed to produce a distinct, perishable good, yjt, that is sold on a
monopolistic-competitive market at price pjt. This intermediate good is sold to other intermediate
producers and the ﬁnal-good producer. Furthermore, the intermediate-good producer is assumed
to pay quadratic adjustment costs when it changes its nominal price. Purchases of intermediate
goods as inputs to production for other intermediate producers must be ﬁnanced through
borrowing from the ﬁnancial intermediary.
3.1 The household
Faced with a budget constraint, the representative household chooses consumption, ct, real money
balances, , and leisure, (1 - ht), that will maximize a utility function of
the form:
2. Dib (2002) constructs and estimates a dynamic, stochastic, general-equilibrium model with price and
wage rigidities and capital-adjustment costs.
j 01 , () Î
Mt
c pt ¤ Mt Dt – () pt ¤ =5
(1)
where  is the discount factor, g and h are positive structural parameters, Mt is the total
money balance in the economy, Dt is household deposits at the ﬁnancial intermediaries, and ht is
labour hours. As in Kim (2000), bt summarizes the money-demand shocks and is assumed to
evolve as:
(2)
Let ebt, the serially uncorrelated shock, be normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation sb and .
The household enters period t with kt units of capital and Mt-1 units of money. Capital, kt, and
labour, ht, are supplied by the household to the intermediate-good producers in perfectly
competitive markets. The amounts supplied to each individual intermediate ﬁrm, j, are given by kjt
and hjt. Therefore, aggregate capital and aggregate labour satisfy  and
, for all t. The sources of household income are rent from capital, labour income,
and proﬁts from intermediate-good-producing ﬁrms, , as well as from the
intermediaries, . In addition, at the end of period t, the household receives payments of
principal plus interest, , from intermediaries, where Rt denotes the current gross return on
deposits, Dt.
The household purchases the ﬁnal good at the price pt, part of which it consumes, while the
remainder is invested. The usual relationship between capital, kt, and investment, it, is assumed:
(3)
where  is a constant capital depreciation rate. We assume that each household adjusts
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where fk is a positive capital-adjustment cost parameter. With this speciﬁcation, both total and
marginal capital-adjustment costs are equal to zero in the steady-state equilibrium.
Let rkt be the real rental rate of capital and wt the real wage. The budget constraint facing the
representative household is of the form:
. (5)
Faced with the above budget constraint and equations (3) and (4), the household chooses, in each
period, {ct, Mt, Dt, ht, kt+1}, t =0 ,1 ,2 ,¼, to maximize the utility function given by equation (1).
The optimal decision facing the household can be expressed in the following Bellman equation:
under constraints (3)-(5); Mt
c=Mt-Dt. Wt is the information set upon which expectations formed in
period t are conditioned. Note that, in contrast to the limited-participation models utilized by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) and others, households are free to adjust their deposits
at banks after the current period’s shocks are revealed. The real effects of monetary policy come
from price and credit frictions in this model. Given , as the Lagrangian multiplier, the ﬁrst-
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(9)
(10)
Equations (6) and (7) suggest that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labour is equal to the real wage. Equation (8) shows that the marginal utility of real money
balances is equal to the difference between the current marginal utility of consumption and the
expected future marginal utility of consumption adjusted for the expected rate of inﬂation.
Equation (9) indicates that the marginal cost of one dollar used as deposits, in terms of the
marginal utility of real money balances, is equal to the net return, , of this dollar discounted
by the marginal utility of consumption, . Furthermore, equations (8) and (9) imply that the net
nominal interest rate between t and t+1, , is equal to .
Equation (10) indicates the optimal intertemporal wealth allocation.
Following Ireland (1997) and Kim (2000), equations (6) and (8) can be used to approximate a real
money-demand function of the form:
(11)
where g is the interest elasticity of money demand. Note that in equation (11), bt represents a
serially correlated money-demand shock.
3.2 The ﬁnal-good-producing ﬁrm
We assume that a continuum of the intermediate goods is used in the production of the ﬁnal good.
Let yt be the output of a ﬁnal-good ﬁrm. Then, assuming that all intermediate goods are imperfect
substitutes with constant elasticity of substitution, q, we can use the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
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where q > 1. The ﬁnal good, yt, is divided between consumption, investment, and inputs used in
the production of each intermediate good.
Given the price pjt, the ﬁnal-good ﬁrm chooses the quantity of intermediate output, yjt, that
maximizes its proﬁts. The proﬁt-maximization problem is:
(13)
The ﬁrst-order conditions imply that the demand function facing each intermediate-good-
producing ﬁrm is given as:
(14)
The implied ﬁnal-good price index satisﬁes:
(15)
3.3 The intermediate-good-producing ﬁrm
Good yjt is produced using an intermediate-good input, cjt, which is a quantity of the ﬁnal output,
a capital stock, kjt, and labour, hjt, according to the following constant-returns-to scale
technology:
(16)
where is the share of intermediate goods in production, and is the share of
capital in value-added. Huang, Liu, and Phaneuf (2000) also introduce intermediate-goods inputs
in their model to generate more dynamics. At is a technology shock that is common to all
intermediate-good-producing ﬁrms and follows an autoregressive process:
(17)
The serially uncorrelated shock, eAt, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
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Each intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrm, j, must borrow funds, , from ﬁnancial intermediaries
to pay for its intermediate-good inputs. We assume that ﬁrms borrow to pay for intermediate-
goods inputs as opposed to wages or capital because it is equivalent to using the loan as a variable
in the production function and it generates more dynamics in the model.3 Therefore, the ﬁrm faces
the ﬁnancing constraint
for all t=0,1,2, . . . . Since these funds are borrowed at the gross rate, , the ﬁrm must repay
principal plus interest, , at the end of the period.
Next, we follow Rotemberg (1982) by introducing a nominal rigidity into the model. This is done
by assuming that the intermediate-good producer incurs a cost for adjusting its nominal price. The
cost is of the form:
(18)
where  is the price-adjustment cost parameter. The adjustment cost, which is measured in
terms of the ﬁnal good, is explained by Rotemberg as capturing the negative effects of price
changes on the relationship between the ﬁrm and the consumer. Equation (18) shows that this cost
increases in magnitude with the size of the price change and with the overall size of economic
activity (proxied by the total output of the ﬁnal good produced). Note that the price markup is
constant under complete price ﬂexibility ( ), but endogenous when prices are rigid.
Constrained by equation (16) and given the price-adjustment costs, the representative
intermediate-good-producer chooses hjt, kjt, cjt, and pjt, , to maximize the expected
discounted ﬂow of its proﬁts:
The instantaneous proﬁt function is of the form:
(19)






























F pjtyjt ptrktkjt – ptwthjt – ptPACjt – Rt
lptcjt, – =10
where  and , which represent the pricing kernel for contingent claims, are the ﬁrm’s
stochastic discount factor and marginal utility of consumption, respectively. Transforming the
maximization problem into a Bellman equation, we have:
subject to equations (14) and (16). Wt is the information set upon which expectations are
conditioned in period t. With denoting the Lagrangian multiplier, the ﬁrst-order conditions






Equations (20) - (22) equate the marginal productivity of capital, labour, and intermediate goods
to their relative prices. Equation (23) summarizes the adjustment process of the nominal price of
.
From equations (20) and (21), the gross price markup over the marginal cost is . This
markup is equal to  when there are no price-adjustment costs ( ). Thus, in the
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In the presence of nominal price rigidities, however, the markup does adjust to demand and
monetary policy shocks. For instance, following a positive technology shock, the marginal cost
curve shifts downward, and, since the intermediate-good-producing ﬁrm does not fully adjust its
price, both the markup and output increase. On the other hand, a positive aggregate-demand shock
shifts the marginal revenue curve upward, and, given that prices are sticky, the markup decreases,
while labour demand and output increase.
3.4 The monetary authority
As in Dib (2002), we assume that the monetary authority adjusts the short-term interest rate, Rt
(and/or the money supply, Mt), in response to deviations of output, yt, inﬂation, and money-supply
growth. The process governing the evolution of monetary policy is therefore similar to a Taylor
rule:
(25)
where  is the gross growth rate of money in period t,  is the
inﬂation rate, and eRt is a serially uncorrelated and normally distributed interest rate shock with
mean zero and standard deviation sR.
3.5 The intermediary
At the beginning of each period t, households are assumed to make regular deposits, Dt, with a
representative ﬁnancial intermediary. In addition, at the beginning of each period, this
intermediary receives a lump-sum nominal transfer, Xt, from the monetary authority (the central
bank). From the household deposits and transfers, the intermediary can lend  to each
intermediate-good-producing ﬁrm to ﬁnance the intermediate goods used as inputs in production.
Since the loan is taken by the intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrm to cover expenditure on
intermediate-good inputs, equilibrium requires that:
(26)
where  is total loans made in period t. As long as the net nominal interest rate is
positive, all available funds will be lent to ﬁrms and equation (26) will hold with equality. Next,
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(27)
The variable  represents the fraction of total deposits lent out to the intermediate-
good-producing ﬁrms. The remaining portion of deposits, (1 - zt), is held as reserves that earn no
return.
Next, assume that zt is partly endogenous and depends on the state of the economy. The
willingness of intermediaries to lend is assumed to be procyclical. This can be motivated by the
fact that, in good times, the cash ﬂow and net worth of ﬁrms are relatively high. This improves the
creditworthiness of borrowers and increases the willingness of intermediaries to lend. In
particular, zt is assumed to have the following form:
(28)
The state of the economy is given by , the deviation of the output from its steady-state
equilibrium value.4 The elasticity with respect to the state of the economy is given by , and
zt represents shocks to the intermediation process. The process for zt is given by:
(29)
where and ezt is a serially uncorrelated shock that is normally distributed with mean
zero and standard deviation sz.5
In equation (28), yt/y captures the endogenous component of banks’ willingness to lend; zt
represents the exogenous effects, approximates perceived changes in cash ﬂow or net worth (i.e.,
creditworthiness) not measured by yt, and represents exogenous changes in the conﬁdence level of
intermediaries with respect to the credit risks of their borrowers and the health of the economy.
Government regulation of intermediaries (for example, reserve requirements) is one possible
source of ﬂuctuations in the intermediation process.6 Technological advances in the
intermediation process can be considered another source of variation in zt. The process of loan
evaluation certainly has evolved over time, through stochastic technological advances in
4. Thespiritofequation(28)issimilartoCook(1999),whereintermediationcostsdependonthelagged
level of economic activity.
5. In Cooper and Ejarque (2000), the intermediation process is completely exogenous and follows an
AR(1).
6. InCanada,since1993,theﬁnancialintermediarieshavenotbeenrequiredtokeepreserves.Thismay
be interpreted as a shock that affects the intermediation process.
Lt zt Dt Xt + () . £
zt 01 , [] Î
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information services. These variations may represent changes in total factor productivity in the
intermediation process.
At the end of period t, the representative intermediary collects in principal and interest from
all intermediate-good-producing ﬁrms; hence, is the gross nominal interest rate on loans. The
intermediary owes  to its depositors and earns a zero net return on its reserves. As such, the
intermediary proﬁt function is given by
(30)
Competition among intermediaries for loans and deposits guarantees that
(31)
for all t. With competitive intermediaries, ﬂuctuations in the reserve levels of banks would be
reﬂected in the gap between loan and deposit interest rates. Since zt< 1, we have This
intermediation spread decreases as zt increases, so that as intermediaries become more willing to
lend, the supply of funds increases and their proﬁt is squeezed. The maximum nominal proﬁts of
the intermediary, under this condition, are
3.6 Symmetric equilibrium and resolution
In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate-good-producing ﬁrms are identical. They make the
same decisions, so that kjt = kt, hjt = ht, pjt = pit =pt, yjt = yt, cjt = ct, and , " j, i. Let
 denote the inﬂation rate in period t, , and . The
symmetric equilibrium is composed of an allocation, , and a
sequence of prices and co-state variables, , that satisfy the
household’s ﬁrst-order conditions, equations (6) to (10); the intermediate-good-producing ﬁrm’s
ﬁrst-order conditions, equations (20) to (24); the aggregate resource constraint;7 the monetary
policy rule, equation (25); the loan market equilibrium condition, equation (26); the ﬁnancial
intermediary technology and ﬁrst-order conditions, equations (28) and (31); and the stochastic
processes of money demand, technology, and credit shocks, equations (2), (17), and (29),
respectively.
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This system is composed of 15 equations and 15 variables. All variables in the model are
stationary. Taking these deﬁnitions into account, and given the initial values of kt, , and
, we can obtain equilibrium conditions for the allocation
 and the sequence of prices and co-state variables
. A log-linear approximation of the equilibrium system around steady
state is obtained by using the methods described in Blanchard and Kahn (1980). For any
stationary variable, , we deﬁne  as the deviation of  from its steady-state
value, .The log-linearized version of the model can thus be written in its state-space form:
(32)
(33)
where  is a vector of state variables that includes predetermined
variables;  is a vector of control variables;
and the vector  contains technology, money demand, and
monetary policy and credit shocks. The solution is a restricted vector autoregression (VAR) in the
sense that the coefﬁcient matrices, F1, F2, and F3 depend on the structural parameters of the
model. Thus, the state-space solution in equations (32) and (33) is used to simulate the model.
4. Data and Calibration
To calibrate the parameters that occur in the money demand and credit equations, we use two
regressions. In these regressions, we use real per-capita personal spending on non-durable goods
and services and monetary aggregate M1 as measures of consumption, ct, and money balances,
. The GDP deﬂator is used as the price index. The deposit and loan interest rates, Rt and ,
are measured by the 3-month treasury-bill rate and the prime business loan rate, respectively.
Output, yt, is measured by the real GDP per capita. The variables measuring ct, , and yt are
linearly detrended. The data run from 1981Q2 to 2000Q4.
As shown in Appendix A, section A.1, the estimate of , the elasticity of money demand, is
0.0223, and the estimates of rb and sb are 0.8334 and 0.0146, respectively. Since the constant
corresponds to ln(b), however, the estimate value for b is 0.1150. Ireland (2001) also uses this
procedure to estimate money-demand function parameters.
Section A.2 of Appendix A shows the estimation results for t in equation (29) and rzin equation
(30). The estimated value for t is 1.4766, while rzis 0.7817 and sz is 0.0472. In the steady state,
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we set R equal to 1.021, the average in the sample.  is set equal to 1.025, however, so that the
steady-state value of z=z=0.842, as in the data.
Some of parameters are set equal to values commonly used in the literature: d = 0.025, a = 0.33,
b = 0.987, p = 1.0071, and q = 9. The setting q = 9 makes the markup equal to 12.5 per cent. The
setting h = 1.48 implies that the household spends about 0.33 of its time working in the model’s
steady state.
Following the literature, particularly Basu (1995) and Huang, Liu, and Phaneuf (2000), we
consider values of y in the empirically plausible range of 0.2 and 0.6. For the exercise reported on
in this paper, we choose y = 0.3.8
The calibrated values for the remaining parameters are taken from Dib (2002), who estimates a
version of a dynamic, stochastic, general-equilibrium model with price and capital rigidities for
Canada. The parameters of the capital and price rigidities, fk and fp, are set equal to 8.5824 and
16.861, respectively; the steady-state technology shock, A, is set equal to 1, with serial correlation
rA and standard deviation sA equal to 0.90 and 0.0071, respectively. Similarly, the parameters of
the monetary policy rule are set equal to the estimated values in Dib (2002), where rp =0.6717, ry
= 0.072, rm = 0.3686, and sR = 0.0061.
5. Evaluating the Model’s Performance
Given the endogeneity of most of the inputs into the model, described in section 4, and the
interaction between the variables, an appropriate method of analyzing the impact of a shock to a
variable in the model is to study the behaviour of the impulse-response functions generated from
the variance-covariance matrix of the forecast errors of the model. In this section, we examine
these functions in relation to the shocks in the model: monetary policy, credit, money demand,
and technology. In addition to studying the impulse-response functions, we compute the forecast-
error variance decomposition of detrended output, inﬂation, and the interest rate at various
horizons.
We consider the model within various scenarios. First, we examine the model when there are
credit and price frictions (CPF) present; this we denote a CPF model. Second, we consider the
model when there are only credit frictions (CF); this we denote a CF model. Third, to gauge the
impact of credit, we examine a model with no credit frictions; this we denote a standard sticky-
price (SSP) model.
8. We observe that there are no remarkable differences inthe results fory = 0.2 and y= 0.4. The
differences lie inthe magnitude of the responses to credit shocks.
R
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To determine the impact of credit, we need to compare models where the credit friction is in
operation with those where it is absent. In the case where there are no credit frictions, we set t=0 ,
so that z = z = 1 and thus, Rt=Rl
t.
5.1 Impulse-response functions
Figure 1 shows the impact of a 1 per cent increase in the innovations of monetary policy; i.e.,
eRt = 0.01. This represents a tightening of monetary policy. The ﬁgure shows that, for all models,
a contractionary monetary policy that raises short-term interest rates causes a fall in output and
inﬂation. Tight monetary policy also causes a decline in credit.
Although all the models generate the expected behaviour of the transmission mechanism, Figure 1
shows that the magnitude of the effect of monetary policy tightening differs for each model. The
magnitude of the effect on output is strong in the CPF and SSP models, with CPF yielding the
largest impact. The main features of the two models are the same, both having capital and price
rigidities. The CPF model, however, with the credit channel “turned on,” does not substantially
increase the real response of output to the monetary policy shock. The results show that the credit-
market frictions do indeed play a role in the transmission of monetary policy, but that this role is
minor when compared with the contribution of the price rigidity. The results are further supported
by the CF model, which shows that credit-market frictions alone will create only a very small
output response to a monetary policy shock. The credit channel operates by reducing the
willingness of banks to lend (i.e., zt falls) as output falls. Banks cut back their lending and
increase the spread between lending and borrowing rates. This restricts output even further.
However, the particular form of the credit frictions we introduce does not signiﬁcantly augment
the effects of policy shocks. Future estimation will investigate the importance of the other
variables, such as risk measures, in the banks’ production function. In addition, we can increase
the contribution of credit frictions to the persistence of the model’s responses by assuming that zt
is a function of lagged output, as in Cook (1999).
Figure 2 shows the impulse-response functions for an exogenous tightening of credit conditions.
The CPF and CF models are examined. The SSP model, which has the credit channel turned off,
is not included in the ﬁgure because, as expected, it yields no response to the credit shocks.
Although the magnitude of the impact differs between the models, the CPF and CF models
respond similarly to the tighter credit conditions. As expected, the tightening of credit conditions
leads banks to reduce lending and increase the loan rate. Firms react by cutting back on external
funds to ﬁnance intermediate-good inputs, which causes in a fall in production. The central bank
allows the deposit rate to also rise as it injects money (i.e., creates an inﬂation expectation) to
offset the negative consequences of credit shocks. The restriction of credit impacts negatively on17
aggregate supply, as ﬁrms cut back on production, leading to a fall in ﬁnal output. In an attempt to
accommodate the deterioration in credit conditions, the monetary authority reacts by injecting
more liquidity into the economy. The rise in liquidity plus the negative shift of the aggregate
supply curve combine to push up the inﬂation rate.
The persistence of credit shocks is estimated to be quite high (i.e., rz = 0.7817). The result is that
the tighter credit conditions generate persistent movements in all variables. In each case, we ﬁnd
that the variables do not return to their steady-state values even after 10 quarters. The implication
of this result is that a worsening of credit conditions can be very persistent and have a lasting
impact on economic activity. There could also be a persistent increase in the inﬂation rate if the
monetary authority offsets the credit shock by infusing additional liquidity into the economy.9
Figure 3 shows the impulse-response functions for a 1 per cent positive technology shock. As the
ﬁgure shows, we ﬁnd that output increases in response to the positive shock to technology.
Interestingly, the magnitude of the effects on output is greater for the CPF and CF (models with
the credit channel turned on) than for the SSP model (no credit channel), which suggests that
credit magniﬁes and propagates the technology shocks. With the improvement in technology, the
deposit and loan rates as well as the inﬂation rate fall below their steady-state values in the initial
quarters before slowly moving back towards their steady-state values. Borrowing is seen to rise
for about 4 quarters following the technology shock as banks loosen their credit conditions and
ﬁrms’ demand increases. Money growth responds negatively to the technology shock.
The technology shock is a positive supply-side shock that causes inﬂation to fall. The disinﬂation
causes the monetary authorities to gradually ease monetary conditions by lowering interest rates.
In addition, banks seeing brighter prospects with improved technology respond by easing terms
and conditions and increasing the supply of funds it lends out. This causes lending rates to fall.
Capital and labour become very productive as a result of the positive technology shock, which
leads to increased production and, consequently, rising demand for credit. All these factors
accelerate and magnify the rise in economic activity.
Figure 4 shows impulse-response functions for a positive 1 per cent money-demand shock. The
responses of the models to this shock are very similar. The rise in the demand for money is
temporarily followed by an increase in the growth rate of money, which in turn exerts upward
pressure on inﬂation. The monetary authority responds by gradually but persistently increasing
nominal interest rates. The loan rate rises, forcing ﬁrms to borrow less. The combination of these
factors results in economic activity slowing down in the ﬁrst 4 quarters of the money-demand
shock. Although the responses are very persistent, all the variables begin a slow return to their
steady-state values after 4 quarters.
9. Whenrz= 0, the effects of credit shocks on inﬂation are moderately persistent.18
5.2 Variance decomposition
To complement our analysis of the impulse-response functions, we examine the forecast error
variance decomposition. The decomposition enables us to understand the proportion of the
volatility in a series explained by each of the model’s shocks. The results of the decompositions
are reported in Tables 1 to 3.
The results indicate that, for models with the credit channel turned on, credit is important in
explaining the variations in output. We observe that, in the ﬁrst 4 quarters, credit explains between
10 and 17 per cent of the ﬂuctuations in output. Although the contribution of credit falls with the
lengthening of the forecasting horizon, it still accounts for about 5 per cent of the variation in
output after four years. In addition, we ﬁnd that credit shocks substitute for monetary policy
shocks as sources of output variation.
The variance decomposition results also show that, in the credit models, the contribution of credit
shocks to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation occurs more at longer horizons, where it accounts for about 10
per cent of the variation. The main sources of the ﬂuctuations in inﬂation come from technology
and monetary policy shocks. As expected, monetary policy shocks contribute to the ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation because the deviation of inﬂation from its steady state is a major component of the rule
used by the monetary authority to set the interest rate. The contribution of technology to the
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation comes from its strong correlation with aggregate supply.
The results also suggest that credit shocks play a signiﬁcant role in explaining the ﬂuctuations of
the short-term lending rate. More of the volatility is explained by credit shocks than it is by
monetary policy shocks. This supports conventional thinking that worsening credit conditions
push up interest rates because of increased risk premiums. In all cases, we ﬁnd technology shocks
to be responsible for most of the variation in the short-term lending rate.
For the model with the credit frictions turned off, the results in Table 3 are very similar to those
found in the literature for standard real business cycle models (Dib 2002), where technology
shocks are responsible for the greatest part of the ﬂuctuations in output, inﬂation, and interest
rates. As expected, in the SSP model, the contribution of monetary policy shocks to ﬂuctuations in
output is signiﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that, in addition to technology shocks, monetary shocks play an
important role in the ﬂuctuation of inﬂation in this non-credit model. In all models, however,
money-demand shocks account for a very small fraction of the variations in output and inﬂation,
and a signiﬁcant fraction of the short-term interest rate. Overall, credit shocks contribute
substantially to the volatility of output and the interest rate.19
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have re-examined the role of bank lending in the Canadian monetary
transmission mechanism. We used a dynamic general-equilibrium model with price- and capital-
adjustment costs to study the interaction between ﬁnancial factors and real economic activity. An
advantage of taking this approach is that ﬁnancial effects are given explicit micro-foundations,
which has allowed us to study conditions under which interactions between real and ﬁnancial
factors are likely to matter.
A general ﬁnding of our study is that the response of output to monetary policy shocks is
magniﬁed slightly when the model incorporates credit frictions. Credit shocks are also observed
to have a signiﬁcant impact on output, inﬂation, and the short-term interest rate. The results show
that the bank lending channel is an important facet of the dynamics of the economy. Imperfections
in the credit markets are partly responsible for the ampliﬁcation and propagation of the effects of
real or monetary policy shocks.20
References
Asquith, P., R. Gertner, and D. Sharfstein. 1994. “Anatomy of Financial Distress.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109: 625–58.
Basu, S. 1995. “Intermediate Goods and Business Cycles: Implications for Productivity and Wel-
fare.” American Economic Review 85: 512–31.
Blanchard, O. and C. Kahn. 1980. “The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational
Expectations.” Econometrica 48: 1305–11.
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and C. Evans. 1997. “Sticky Price and Limited Participation
Models of Money: A Comparison.” European Economic Review 41: 1201–49.
Cook, D. 1999. “The Liquidity Effect and Money Demand.” Journal of Monetary Economics 43:
377–90.
Cooper, R. and J. Ejarque. 2000. “Financial Intermediation and Aggregate Fluctuations: A Quan-
titative Analysis.” Journal of Macroeconomics 4: 423–47.
Dib, A. 2002. “Nominal Rigidities and Monetary Policy Rule in Canada Since 1981.” Bank of
Canada Working Paper No. 2002-25.
Diamond, D. 1984. “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.” Review of Economic
Studies 5: 393–414.
Dixit, A. and J.E. Stiglitz. 1977. “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity.”
American Economic Review 79: 297–308.
Himmelberg, C. and D. Morgan. 1995. “Is Bank Lending Special?” In Is Bank Lending Important
for the Transmission of Monetary Policy? Edited by J. Peek and E. Rosengren, 15–36.
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series No. 39.
Huang, K., Z. Liu, and L. Phaneuf. 2000. “Staggered Contracts, Intermediate Goods, and the
Dynamic Effects of Monetary Shocks on Output, Inﬂation and Real Wages.” CREFE,
Working Paper No. 112.
Ireland, P.N. 1997. “A Small, Structural, Quarterly Model for Monetary Policy Evaluation.” Carn-
egie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 47: 83–108.
———. 2000. “Interest Rates, Inﬂation, and Federal Reserve Policy Since 1980.” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 32: 417–31.
Kim, J. 2000. “Constructing and Estimating a Realistic Optimizing Model of Monetary Policy.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 45: 329–59.
Rotemberg, J. 1982. “Monopolistic Price Adjustment and Aggregate Output.” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 49: 517–31.21
Table 1: Variance Decomposition in the CPF Model
Percentage owing to the following shocks:
Quarters Variance Monetary policy Technology Money demand Credit
Detrended output
1 0.000091 49.949 27.584 5.585 16.881
2 0.000127 35.702 44.704 4.930 14.663
3 0.000160 28.361 55.378 4.122 12.139
4 0.000190  23.960 62.136 3.539 10.365
5 0.000216 21.095 66.617 3.135 9.154
10 0.000301 15.139 76.029 2.259 6.572
50 0.000395 11.566 81.701 1.724 5.009
Inﬂation
1 0.000036  24.717 74.621 0.038 0.624
2 0.000054 16.702 76.923  1.374 5.001
3 0.000067  13.346 75.504  2.674 8.476
4 0.000078  11.530 74.400 3.574 10.495
5 0.000086 10.419 73.959 4.130 11.492
10 0.000110 8.211 75.603  4.687 11.499
50 0.000137 6.618 80.071 3.944 9.366
Deposit interest rate
1 0.000021 18.707 49.809 7.396  24.088
2 0.000035 11.498 54.537 8.353  25.612
3 0.000045  8.859 57.228 8.647 25.265
4 0.000053 7.509  59.442 8.671 24.379
5 0.000060 6.694 61.386 8.563 23.356
10 0.000060  5.063 68.003  7.618 19.315
50 0.000104 3.908 75.372 5.932  14.78722
Table 2: Variance Decomposition in the CF Model
Percentage owing to the following shocks:
Quarters Variance Monetary policy Technology Money demand Credit
Detrended output
1 0.000077 0.276 95.401 0.686 3.637
2 0.000137 0.165 94.900  0.884 4.050
3 0.000187 0.122 94.914 0.948 4.016
4 0.000229 0.100 95.117 0.952  3.832
5 0.000264 0.086 95.367 0.932 3.614
10 0.000380 0.060  96.327 0.790  2.823
50 0.000524 0.043 97.288 0.592 2.077
Inﬂation
1 0.000089 39.857 59.639 0.300  0.207
2 0.000114 31.899 63.130 1.244 3.727
3 0.000132  27.604 63.136 2.347  6.913
4 0.000145 24.982 63.208 3.089 8.722
5 0.000156 23.240 63.619 3.533 9.608
10 0.000188 19.293 66.882 3.995 9.830
50 0.000232 15.624 72.864 3.397  8.115
Deposit interest rate
1 0.000024 2.426  77.178 4.425 15.971
2 0.000041 1.497  72.430 6.168 19.905
3 0.000055  1.132 71.085 6.909  20.874
4 0.000065 0.946 71.243 7.163 20.648
5 0.000074 0.834 71.996 7.184 19.986
10 0.000101 0.610 76.414 6.457 16.519
50 0.000142 0.436  82.828 4.779 11.95723
Table 3: Variance Decomposition in the SSP Model
Percentage owing to the following shocks:
Quarters Variance Monetary policy Technology Money demand Credit
Detrended output
1 0.000061  62.532 29.689 7.778 0.000
2 0.000087 43.874 49.340 6.786 0.000
3 0.000114 33.746 60.756 5.499 0.000
4 0.000138 27.804 67.596  4.601 0.000
5 0.000160 24.045 71.955 4.000 0.000
10 0.000231 16.623 80.606 2.771 0.000
50 0.000306 12.581 85.322 2.097 0.000
Inﬂation
1 0.000035 27.729 72.265 0.006 0.000
2 0.000047 20.591 78.053 1.356 0.000
3 0.000055 17.613 79.378 3.009 0.000
4 0.000061 15.908 79.748 4.345 0.000
5 0.000066 14.785 79.948 5.267 0.000
10 0.000080 12.235 81.285 6.480 0.000
50 0.000097 10.123 84.243 5.634 0.000
Deposit interest rate
1 0.000012 20.877 67.496 11.628 0.000
2 0.000019 13.111 72.940 13.949 0.000
3 0.000025 10.139 75.020 14.840 0.000
4 0.000030 8.567 76.379 15.053 0.000
5 0.000034  7.595  77.485 14.920 0.000
10 0.000046  5.598  81.284 13.118 0.000
50 0.000062 4.218 85.811 9.971 0.00024
Figure 1: The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks in the Models
For the impulse-response functions, the solid line represents the CPF model, the dashed line the
SSP model, and the dotted line the CF model.25
Figure 2: The Effects of Credit Shocks in the Models
For the impulse-response functions, the solid line represents the CPF model, and the dashed line
the CF model.26
Figure 3: The Effects of Technology Shocks in the Models
For the impulse-response functions, the solid line represents the CPF model, the dashed line the
SSP model, and the dotted line the CF model.27
Figure 4: The Effects of Money-Demand Shocks in the Models
For the impulse-response functions, the solid line represents the CPF model, the dashed line the
SSP model, and the dotted line the CF model.28
Appendix A
A.1 Money Demand Equation
In performing our examination of the bank lending channel, we must estimate the demand for real





where is the net deposit interest rate and . Standard errors are
in parentheses.
A.2 The Loan Equation
Next, we estimate the parameters for the intermediary technology. From the ﬁrst-order conditions,
we have:
. (A2)
From our main text, we also have:
. (A3)
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Using the equilibrium condition of , we can rewrite equation (A5) as:
. (A6)
Since  and , we use the Cochrane-





Standard errors are in parentheses.
From the regression summarized by equations (A7) and (A8), we have:
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